"blinding" of him and the "beheading" of her, but politics in its deeper aspect as what happens after a person has dropped the scroll-the assurance of stabilityand the problem of chaos ensues.
While the violence that Ran displays to excess has a place in every social order, Kurosawa's "chaos" arises from a contestation among rival versions of order, each claiming for itself the status of truth, and each plunging its opponents into ceaseless unease. Violence can be used by anyone toward almost any end; chaos is the product of a disarray on the level of the "life-world," which Edmund Husserl was the first to define as the "horizon," socially constituted and intersubjective, that each of us takes for granted as we move through our everyday lives. In the life-world, my experience repeatedly affirms the "naturalness" of whatever I see or think or do, and at those moments when events arrest this "natural" flow, I will renew its coherence as completely as I can, if not by transforming my actual circumstances, then by learning to perceive them in a more encompassing way (Husserl 142-47; also Merleau-Ponty 84-97, Schutz 3-15). Yet it is just this renewal that chaos threatens, for the collision of worlds, as Kurosawa demonstrates, may at last call into doubt the possibility of an order not created and sustained by violence alone. KNOWLEDGE 
AND EMBODIMENT
That the crisis of postmodernity has overtaken us in composition surely no one can doubt. Given the proliferation of academic disciplines, each with its restrictive dialect, and given our growing awareness that behind these dialects lie vastly different modes of seeing and acting, the days are gone when we could simply announce, as Henry Seidel Canby did in 1912, that "Good form in writing" is the same as "good form in dress. It is bad form to wear a flannel shirt with a dress coat, or a white lawn tie with a sack suit. It is quite as bad form to ... make mistakes in grammar" (xiv). The days are gone as well, or I hope they are, when most teachers of writing would accept at face value the conclusions of researchers like Carl Bereiter, who argued two decades ago that poor blacks in Urbana, Illinois, were a people without any language worth the name: without a language, or a culture, or the power to reason (112-113). Rejecting such opinions, more careful researchers, among them William Labov and Mina Shaughnessy, Shirley Brice Heath and Mike Rose, have helped us to see that the peoples supposedly without a language preserve their own "ways with words," ways as logical, complex, and elaborated as those familiar to the speakers of "standard English"-the language, that is, of the white middle class, from whose ranks have come most college-level teachers in our field. Although these teachers, the "we" of the following essay, once taught something simply known as "good English," we now teach a dialect among many dialects, and the distinction signals a major shift in our values and practices. Still, rehearsing these details does not help, I think, to explain why the politics of language and instruction has become so much a matter of controversy. No one who understands that language and the university are themselves historical constructs can ignore the fact that each has been constructed in the interests of some groups at the expense of others, and to the detriment of some values for the sake of others. Even E. D. Hirsch adopts this position when he equates literacy with culture. But we have yet to recognize what culture is: neither a stock of fundamental facts and terms nor a repertoire of conventions, neither a LeviStraussian bricolage of structures nor a Geertzian "ensemble of texts," but something closer to tales that must be told, retold, and revised until they seem real to the teller (Levi-Strauss 16-22, 75-108; Geertz, Interpretation 452). By forgetting both the teller and this process of revision, we have failed to acknowledge our complicity in the persistence of an ethnocentrism all the more profound because it masquerades as tolerance.
For some indication of just how profound the ethnocentrism is, I would like to consider an essay, "The Man Made of Words," by N. Scott Momaday, a writer of Kiowa ancestry who speaks about language and social life from the interface between his "horizon" and ours. There Momaday observes, "It seems to me that in a certain sense we are. . . made of words; that our most essential being consists in language. It is the element in which we think and dream and act, in which we live our daily lives. There is no way in which we can exist apart from the morality of a verbal dimension" (Hobson 162). To illustrate the nature of this dimension and to argue its distinctly moral quality-to argue, that is, a link between our language and our lives in the world-Momaday recalls his final hours at work on The Way to Rainy Mountain, a narrative that weaves together Kiowa history and myth with his private impressions while retracing the journey of his ancestors from the Yellowstone country to Oklahoma where they met, fought, and lost to successive waves of white settlers. As our historians used to assure us, the destiny of the white settlers was providentially manifest, but the Kiowa were forced to play out a hidden and ironic destiny, for their journey of collective self-fashioning was interrupted by their near-annihilation, and it may have been the sense of something prematurely terminated, something yet to be written, that left Momaday unsure of what he should say in his epilogue.
When he began to write again, however, this time about the end of his ancestors' migrations, Momaday remembered an old woman, Ko-sahn, from whom he had heard stories one summer-and abruptly he saw that these stories held the key not only to Kiowa history, but also to his project. Ko-sahn, he realized then, was the embodiment of everything that remained unsaid, the uncompleted narrative of his people. Or rather, she made it possible for Momaday himself to embody the past, transposing it into his own life:
For some time I sat looking down at these words on the page, trying to deal with the emptiness that had come about inside of me. The words did not seem real. I could scarcely believe that they made sense, that they had anything whatsoever to do with meaning. In desperation almost, I went back over the final paragraphs, backwards and forwards, hurriedly. My eyes fell upon the name Ko-sahn. And all at once everything seemed suddenly to refer to that name. The name seemed to humanize the whole complexity of language.
What happened next to Momaday happened, as he might put it, at the boundary between the lived world and the "verbal dimension":
Then it was that that ancient, one-eyed woman Ko-sahn stepped out of the language and stood before me on the page. I was amazed. Yet it seemed entirely appropriate that this should happen.
" Words, Momaday reminds us, come from the past unembodied, and they cannot be embodied-cannot have a meaning, as opposed to an abstract definition-until they take on the power to explain the reader's circumstances to himself, just as Ko-sahn does for Momaday. And yet once words have assumed this explanatory power, they no longer operate as "text" at all, a verbal artifact distinct from the flow of experience. To the extent that words become real and meaningful, they also change how the reader thinks and sees and feels. As meaning, a text is embodied in the reader, and this embodiment effects a "deep" transformation of both the reader's universe of language and sense of self, reconciling them within the contours of a single reality. But the "depth" of this change, as Momaday represents it, is neither a quality of the text nor an attribute of the reader; rather, it emerges as a consequence of their shared capacity to disclose a world.
Of course we who are not of Kiowa descent might prefer to dismiss Ko-sahn's appearance as a "literary device"-as, in my terms, "not deep." But Momaday intends to question our longstanding common-sense distinction between words and things: the belief that we can see Ko-sahn without the agency of language, and conversely, that we can speak her name in a meaningful fashion without also bearing witness to her presence. If Momaday suggests that words mean nothing outside the context of particular events, he also argues that the way events reveal themselves depends on the language we use. Because words have the potential to conceal as well as disclose, any struggle over language at the same time entails a struggle over worlds fought on the deepest levels of the self-that part of the self most intimately connected with other selves and with history. To silence any person, to prohibit his speech or discredit his manner of speaking, is therefore to silence much more than the person, not only everyone from whom the speaker learned his words, but also everything these words have made real: the Sun Dance ofMomaday's ancestors; the sacred Sun Dance Doll Tai-me; the prophetic falling of the stars in 1833, which signaled the end of the Kiowas' sovereignty. We should not forget that Momaday writes as someone who has seen the devastation of a world, and now struggles to resurrect it by recovering its names, images, and narratives. While he addresses us in our language, and on terms we can readily appreciate, he also writes as a person who has viewed this language from an outsider's perspective-has known firsthand its ability to silence those who give things other names. As much as his essay reaffirms our life-world and our language, it also takes aim against them. By reconstructing the traditions of his forebears in words partly ours and partly his, Momaday resists, and then presses back, the limitations of a culture which has endangered his own legacy.
Momaday's predicament-and increasingly ours as well at a time when there are more and more Momadays around-arises from his uneasy situation between worlds often violently opposed. The writer Simon J. Ortiz, from the Acoma Pueblo in New Mexico, describes this same predicament in the short story "Woman Singing" through the impressions of his narrator Clyde, a migrant farm worker in Idaho. One afternoon when Clyde hears a woman singing in the shack across from his, he remembers the songs of his people, the Navajo, on their reservation far to the south. Later Clyde and another Indian worker, Willie, go into town to watch a movie about a very different kind of singer:
Hank Williams was the singer's name. Clyde knew who he was, used to be on the Grand Ole Opry on radio, he remembered, sang songs he remembered too. Clyde thought about the singers back home. The singers of the land, the people, the rain, the good things of his home. His uncle on his mother's side was a medicine man, and he used to listen to him sing.. When the African novelist Ngugi wa Thiong'o writes about the education of children under the British colonial regime in Kenya, he restores to the discussion of language and culture much that remains concealed by postcolonial high theory. Like the Kiowa and Navajo, Ngugi's people, the Gikuyu, one day found themselves strangers in their native land. Under the tutelage of British supervisors, the development of young Gikuyu "was now determined," Ngugi recalls, "by the dominant language" of English and the dominant culture of northern Europe. In primary school, the children of Ngugi's generation, whose parents had grown up with the tales of Hare and Leopard and Lion, read Dickens and Stevenson and H. Rider Haggard (12). Not only did the pedagogy of the colonists intentionally divide the school from the home, but it colonized what Ngugi calls the "mental universe" of its subjects. For these children, thinking transpired in a language far removed from the world they knew firsthand, and this world, their world, they learned to see through the eyes of those who despised them. Ngugi himself remembers reading Hume's famous dictum that "the negro is naturally inferior to the whites," and Hegel's altogether characteristic opinion, in The Philosophy of Histoiy, that "there was nothing harmonious with humanity to be found in the African character" (16-18). No matter how the colonizers imagined their undertaking, to Ngugi it meant the loss of a "harmony" between the self, the world, and language (28).
The experience of colonial subjects like Ngugi, Momaday, and Ortiz differs greatly from the experience of middle-class whites. But on the level of deep politics the colonization of the student's "mental universe," the discrediting of his or her everyday language and common-sense world, is a phenomenon that reaches far beyond any single class or nationality and beyond ideologies of left and right. Well before Europeans colonized sub-Saharan Africa, they had already colonized themselves, smashing down their small-scale societies and overturning their local knowledge-not once but so often and so thoroughly that the most "advanced" societies are also those to which the state of "homelessness" has become most tenaciously endemic (Hobsbawm 44-73). Almost everyone can claim, as Ngugi does, that formal education in some sense concealed the events it supposedly explained and that the language of the classroom could "never, as spoken or written, properly reflect... the real life" of the student's own "com-munity" (16). While not everyone benefits equally from the prevailing balance of terrors and powers, the logic of colonization applies to everyone alike. On the top as on the bottom, we are all colonized, and the fact of our mutual oppression explains why colonization continues-as a deep cultural logic-long after the troops have gone home.
The troops, so to speak, are now within us. Even a person like Joan Didion, born to relative privilege, describes her education in the essay "Why I Write" much as Ngugi does:
During the years when I was an undergraduate at Berkeley I tried, with a kind of hopeless late-adolescent energy, to buy some temporary visa into the world of ideas, to forge for myself a mind that could deal with the abstract.
In short I tried to think. I failed. My attention veered inexorably back to the specific, to the tangible, to what was generally considered . . . the peripheral.
(Smart 257-5 8)
The "peripheral" was Didion's life, and although she represents her frustrations as uniquely hers, it is the familiar, almost universal character of her observations here that might lead us to look for a larger, and social, cause. Like many of our students, Didion understood formal knowledge as removed from, even antithetical to, her actual circumstances, and for Didion, within the academy at least, this division became insurmountable. "During those years," she recalls in her essay, "I was traveling on what I knew to be a very shaky passport, forged papers: I knew that I was no legitimate resident in any world of ideas. I knew I couldn't think" (Smart 258). The deep political consequence of Didion's estrangement from the "world of ideas" was still another division: between herself and others, between her private life and a public world always vaguely imagined as "out there." Convinced she "couldn't think," Didion became a "writer" by default: someone committed to a redefining of words on the basis of her lived experience. To the extent that speech and writing permit-in fact, demand-such redefinitions, words are perpetually political. And to the extent that institutions, English departments among them, can enable or prevent the embodiment of ideas and the destruction or renewal of life-worlds, their function is political as well. But if politics confronts us as an inescapable fact, which specific form of politics will we foster? By expanding the canon and revising undergraduate curricula in the spirit of multiculturalism, we may still overlook what matters most-not knowledge but the uses of knowledge. Even with all the curricular changes now in place at schools like Berkeley, Syracuse, and Minnesota, nothing will really have changed in English unless we are willing to promote the use of knowledge by our students as a means of renewing and enlarging their specific historical loyalties. Adding Malcolm X to a reading list is not the same as reconstructing the university to make room for Black Muslims and their way of life. And "making room" should mean more than reducing this way of life to a subject for analysis at the hands of an instructor whose pose of professional dispassion and rigor may conceal (but not prevent) efforts at converting Black Muslim students to a rival faith or allegiance.
By ignoring the political distinction between adding texts to a list and bringing "otherness" into our professional arenas, we may preserve the appearance of uncoercive inquiry when we are really on the road to Kurosawa's earthly hell of mutual incomprehension-which is, I should point out for those who missed the film, a version of King Lear's. And Lear's kingdom falls into chaos not because he has grown too careless of order, but because in his obsession with it he neglects the preservation of intersubjective understanding, the understanding that comes with the willingness to see through the eyes of those least like oneself. Whatever reason might become in the centuries that followed, it would seem to have its origins in the phenomenon of oppression, just as Nietzsche understood. Through reason, the victim fabricates a compensatory inner self and a second, "rational" world beyond the reach of the oppressor, a world in which the silent can speak and the defeated can achieve an unachievable redress. Yet the mind's liberation carries with it a hidden price, and that price is the asceticism of disembodiment, for when reason no longer serves the body by enlarging the sphere of its concrete interactions, it becomes a surreptitious ally of the oppressor. Such, Nietzsche alleges, was the case with Socrates, who responded to the chaos in Athens not by pursuing new modes of experience but by claiming to have glimpsed a realm of "truth" that experience could do nothing to change. In Nietzsche's view, the result was an unparalleled disaster: armed with reason, Socrates's young admirers-the West's first missionaries-waged a war on the life-world of their stammering, defenseless fellow citizens (Nietzsche 478). Though a student of the Buryats' Mongolian dialect and a worker in Siberia's "mission fields" for the better part of two decades, Swan never seems to have appreciated the most basic features of the religion he labored so long and so hard to exterminate. On some level he knew that the lamas he derided as unreasoning (comparing them to "Papists," among many other things) were heirs to an ancient and highly sophisticated tradition of dialectics, and that the most eminent among them had undergone scholarly training in the Buddhist canon and in the literary legacy of India and Tibet, a training more extensive than the infrequent education Swan himself had received (Bawden 84-86; 156-168). For Swan, nonetheless, the Buryat were always to remain a people without knowledge, a people who had never learned "to think." In this same spirit Swan's contemporary, the explorermissionary Dr. Livingstone, made a point of openly violating the religious conventions of the tribes whose hospitality he enjoyed, just as Ricci, two centuries earlier, had set out to master Chinese culture, even going so far as to adopt the clothing of a Buddhist priest, in order to cast down the whole edifice more completely ( After showing him all, God told him he must go back and tell his people they must be good and love one another, have no quarreling, and live in peace with the whites; that they must work, and not lie or steal; that they must put away the old practices that savored of war; that if they faithfully obeyed his instructions they would at last be reunited with their friends in this other world, where there would be no more death or sickness or old age. He was then given the dance which he was commanded to bring back to his people. By performing this dance at intervals, for five consecutive days each time, they would secure this happiness to themselves and hasten the event. Finally, God gave him control over the elements so that he could make it rain or snow. (Mooney 14) True or false? Warranted or unwarranted? To ask these questions at the outset is in my view worse than absurd; by doing so we renew a long history of violence aimed not only at others, but also at those aspects of our own experience we have never understood or acknowledged. Far from requiring the kind of detachment that Plato recommends in the Phaedrus, the detachment of the thinker who has learned to transcend the specificity of his circumstances, Wilson's words seek out an embodiment in us, a change in our manner of perceiving the world. To illustrate what happens on the grand scale when this higher pluralism disappears, I want to conclude with one author's account of a society that ours may increasingly come to resemble, both in its diversity and in its unwillingness to acknowledge diversity's uses. The society is Sri Lanka, and the author is Stanley Tambiah, a contemporary anthropologist of Southeast Asian societies. According to Tambiah, the growing political conflict between a largely Buddhist Sinhalese majority-the "missionaries" in his narrative-and a largely Hindu Tamil minority has produced a war of interpretations, a struggle to control the "text" of the island's ancient culture. Haunted by fears of disloyalty and collapse, fears made worse by the island's economic decline, the Sinhalese majority has attempted to assimilate the Tamils through such measures as a "Sinhala only" language policy, and these measures have inspired a determined and sometimes murderous Tamil resistance (74-75). What seems most enigmatic to Tambiah is the suddenness of the rupture between two groups that enjoyed eight hundred years of coexistence, including three centuries of occupation by the Portuguese, Dutch, and British.
Man, as Kenneth Burke is rumored to have said, does not live by the idea of bread alone. And because reason all too often and too easily prefers ideas over bread itself, its romance conceals a destructiveness that philosophers sometimes
Although no single account can do justice to so complex a phenomenon, Tambiah notes the disappearance of shared rituals and icons that sustained enduring peace through a de facto hermeneutic openness. One exemplary shared icon, possibly the most important one of all, was the god Kataragama, whose yearly festival has brought together millions of Sinhalese and Tamils since the 1500s. While Hindu priests presided at the shrine proper, each group paid its respects to the god in a different manner and each left the festival with a different sense of what had transpired there. And yet precisely because the festival afforded opportunities for difference, it sustained a commonality as well-a commonalityin-difference now endangered. For the first time on record, Buddhist priests have replaced their Hindu counterparts, and Sinhalese zealots more and more monopolize the previously ecumenical cult, with the worst possible results (Tambiah 59, Obeyesekere 460-61). "However much," Tambiah insists, the loss of pluralism "served in the short run to liberate collective energies," the ideology of "communal identity"-the ideology of mandatory sameness-has in the long run "functioned as ... an engine of domination" (141). But Tambiah leaves relatively unexplored the "existential" sources of the ideology, which may owe less to Sinhalese traditions than to the deep politics of embodiment, the same struggle that now drives our fierce debates over canons and curricula.
On the basis of our history since the Industrial Revolution, we might speculate that the ideology of mandatory sameness marks the advent in Sri Lanka of the modern nation-state, governed by professional politicians, administered by unelected functionaries, financed by corporations, and culturally normalized by the schools. But this ideology of sameness, for the Sri Lankans as for us, may have a deeper source in a profound self-hatred. What the Sinhalese fear most about the Tamils is the truth about themselves, to which the Tamils, merely by their presence, bear an inadvertent witness. With rising popular expectations and a declining economy, many Sinhalese now doubt their capacity to face the crisis, and instead of attempting to resolve it by transforming their way of life, they have set off on a search for disembodied and idealized compensations, a collective denial of their most recent and most pressing experience of failure. By fabricating a tradition that belies the complexity of the past, they can forget who they are today, and by imposing a single normative interpretation on cultural fixtures like the Kataragama festival, they can compel the Tamils to join them, in both their predicament and their world-denying asceticism.
We scarcely need the example of Sri Lanka, however, to see Tambiah's "engine of domination" grinding on. As often as universities have encouraged the embodiment of knowledge, they have played the very opposite role by enforcing some version of what Arthur Schlesinger calls our "national identity" (21). Given the academy's conflicted heritage-of popular empowerment as well as normalization-our most deeply political act as teachers of English may be to reconsider "politics" itself, which has typically justified a regimen of "explaining" knowledge to our students or of deconstructing it for them, as if our worlds and theirs were already the same. Convinced that truth lies beyond change and difference, our predecessors strained to overlook those moments of experience that seemed most menacing, unruly, and alien. And now we, while attempting to reclaim those moments, still regard truth as something to be fashioned on behalf of others, when in fact we cannot predict-though we should certainly try to learn-how the meaning of our knowledge changes once it enters the life-worlds of people unlike ourselves.
Far more deeply political than "politics" today is a practice far more difficult for teachers as well as students: Mooney's practice of pursuing through difference a transformation of the self; of straining, as Momaday strains, to hear in the unfamiliar words of others the voices from his own past. The translation of such a practice into scholarship and pedagogy falls beyond the purview of this essay, but every text we teach is a Kataragama, whose openness to multiple interpretations we can deny or accept but never contain. Indebted as they are to a tradition of denial-a tradition devised to contain this openness in the name of an order "always already" manifest-politics and pedagogy in their usual forms continue the missionaries' task. But like William Swan among the Buryat, we may find that the gospel carried to the wilderness is neither welcome nor useful there. Any knowledge which might be useful must give people something "deeper" than one gospel or another; it must assist them in their particular struggles to decide who they have been and what they will become. Without claiming to provide for the salvation of our students, teachers of writing have a part to play in these struggles; and considering that more than words are at stake, perhaps we actually will. 
